Housing policy and the social benefits of home ownership. by N. Edward Coulson
   Business Review  Q2  2002   7 www.phil.frb.org
T
BY N. EDWARD COULSON
Housing Policy and the Social Benefits
of Homeownership








scholar in the Research Department of
the Philadelphia Fed.
he major subsidies to homeownership arise
from the U.S. tax code, and the costs of these
subsidies are high. Are the social benefits
from homeownership sufficient to warrant
such subsidies? In this article, Ed Coulson reviews the
research on the social benefits of ownership and some
related questions. The evidence indicates that
homeownership does carry substantial social benefits,
but their dollar value remains uncertain.
Homeownership has long been
a goal of social policy in the United
States, and programs to promote it have
been extraordinarily successful, at least
on the surface. The homeownership rate
￿ the percentage of households that
live in housing units that they own ￿
has risen from around 40 percent before
World War II, to around 65 percent
today. This pronounced rise has surely
been in part due to the subsidies that
owner-occupied housing has received.
The major subsidies to homeownership
arise from the U.S. income tax code,
and their costs are high.
Are such subsidies warranted?
They can be if the social benefits from
homeownership ￿ the benefits received
by those other than the homeowners
themselves ￿ are substantial. A variety
of potential social benefits have been
discussed in the economics literature.
The evidence indicates that home-
ownership carries substantial social





that encourage homeownership (such as
the Federal Home Loan Bank System
and the Federal Housing Administra-
tion) were established in the 1930s and
1940s, the oldest, and perhaps most
powerful, incentives for ownership lie in
the federal income tax code. The two
most important such incentives have
been part of the code since its formation
in 1913:  the exclusion of rental income
in an owner-occupied unit and the
deductibility of mortgage interest.1
Tax Subsidies and Their
Effects. As Satyajit Chatterjee ex-
plained in an earlier issue of the Business
Review, the owner of a piece of real
estate might consider renting it to
another household and live in a rental
unit somewhere else. Although some
people might want to do this (say, if they
become empty-nesters and wish to live
in a smaller unit), the tax system
discourages this behavior because the
rental income that others pay a landlord
is taxable income for the landlord,
whereas if we own the house we live in,
we pay ourselves rent, which is not
taxed.  The Internal Revenue Service
doesn￿t consider this rent to oneself to be
part of a homeowner￿s income (and you
probably don￿t either) presumably be-
cause there￿s no record of any transac-
tion taking place and no funds changing
hands. Nevertheless this rental income is
as real as the house you live in and
provides a major subsidy to home-
ownership.2 As Chatterjee also pointed
out, the deductibility of mortgage
interest, while far more ￿visible￿ than
the exclusion of rent, is, in reality, a
1 Owner-occupied housing is also subsidized
through the exclusion of the first $250,000 to
$500,000 in capital gains from the sale of the
unit and through the deductibility of local
and state property taxes (see the article by
Steven Bourassa and William Grigsby).
Evidence suggests that these are less
important in terms of their impact on the
economy or tax collections than the exclusion
of rental income and the deductibility of
mortgage interest.
2 Indeed, a number of European countries tax
this implicit income. Whether such a tax can
be administered fairly is an open question,
since the absence of an actual record of the
transaction leaves unknown the dollar
amount of the implicit rent.8   Q2  2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
device that allows those who finance
the purchase of their homes to have the
same tax advantages (with  regard to
the rent excludability) as those who own
their homes outright.
In a 1991 study, James Follain
and David Ling estimated that the loss
in federal tax revenue from those two
provisions was in excess of $100 billion in
1988, and it is almost assuredly larger
than that today.3 More important, these
tax breaks can give rise to  ￿overinvest-
ment￿ in housing. Overinvestment in
this context means that the treatment of
housing in the tax code causes people to
invest more in housing (by becoming
homeowners or buying a larger house)
and less in other investment vehicles
than would otherwise be the case. That,
after all, is the point. But people do this
because housing is cheaper than other
investments, or, in what amounts to the
same thing, housing has a higher rate of
return because of the tax breaks. This
gives housing an advantage over an
investment whose return is taxed in the
ordinary way.
This can be bad for the
economy as a whole because some
housing investments, for example, the
ones that wouldn￿t get built if there were
no tax breaks, are driving out invest-
ments that have a higher rate of return
before taxes. This brings down the ag-
gregate value of gross domestic product
(GDP), that is, what the country
produces. So, to the extent that GDP
measures our well-being, this overinvest-
ment in housing is not good, as noted by
Edwin Mills in a 1987 Business Review
article. This overinvestment is perhaps
substantial; the most recent estimate ￿
1998 ￿ comes from a study by Lori
Taylor, who claims that roughly $200
billion in GDP is lost each year because
of this misallocation of capital.4
In addition, it is somewhat
disconcerting that these tax preferences
are more beneficial to homeowners with
higher levels of  income because the
value of the tax deductions is directly
linked to the marginal tax bracket of the
household. When you are in the 27
percent bracket, the government is in
effect paying 27 percent of your
mortgage interest bill each month. But if
your income is low enough to qualify
you for the 15 percent bracket, the
government pays only 15 percent. The
largest subsidies go to those in the
highest tax brackets, that is, those with
the highest income.
Moreover, the subsidies to
owner-occupied housing are thought to
be responsible, at least in part, for other
problems in the economy. One of these
is urban sprawl. In a 1999 article in the
Business Review, Richard Voith argued
that the desire for larger amounts of
space, spurred by the tax treatment
described above, pushes the borders of
urban areas beyond what is desirable.
Another economist, Andrew Oswald,
has argued that homeownership is
directly tied to unemployment. To
become owners, people spend a great
deal of time and money upfront in the
form of search costs, finance charges,
and the like. Therefore, they are more
closely tied, both financially and
psychologically, to their dwellings than
renters are. Consequently, owners are
reluctant to move when their job
prospects change.  Oswald presents some
evidence for this from European
countries. The article by Coulson and
Fisher finds little support for this link in
the United States.
Why Subsidize Homeowner-
ship? If subsidizing homeownership has
such negative effects on the economy,
why are there such lucrative tax
incentives in its favor? One argument is
simply that homeownership is a good
thing. Not only is it part of the Ameri-
can dream, but it￿s also something that
people ￿should￿ have, in the same way
that they ￿should￿ have medical care or
even food. And since we have programs
such as Medicare and food stamps that
lower the price of these goods, why not
programs for homeownership as well?
Such ￿merit good￿ arguments,
as they are called, are unsatisfactory. On
the one hand, if the goal is to simply
make people better off, the government
could just provide cash or lower tax rates
to all households and avoid the misallo-
cation of capital described above. On
the other hand, providing tax breaks for
any commodity, for no other reason than
that it￿s good for consumers, smacks of
paternalism ￿ the notion that the
3 The mortgage interest deduction on its own
accounted for only about 10 percent of this
figure. Presumably, the $100 billion figure
would be higher today, since more households
are owners and marginal tax rates have
increased in the top brackets since then
(which increases the value of the deduction).
4 The method used by both Mills and Taylor
involves calculating the real rate of return to
housing and nonhousing capital. Each of these
authors finds that the marginal return to
housing is less than the marginal return to
nonhousing capital. They infer from this that
GDP would be higher if investment were
shifted out of housing. Their method thus
assesses the overinvestment that arises from
all forms of housing policy preferences,
including the tax features noted above.  It
cannot separate out the subsidies directed to
owner-occupied housing from those directed
to landlords, such as accelerated deprecia-
tion, nor to consumers of rental properties
such as public housing. Nevertheless, since
two-thirds of households live in owner-
occupied dwellings, and given the large
estimated loss in revenue from the rental
exclusion, it seems clear that much of the
difference noted by Mills and Taylor arises
from subsidies to this group.
The largest subsidies
go to those in the
highest tax brackets,
that is, those with the
highest income.   Business Review  Q2  2002   9 www.phil.frb.org
government somehow knows what is
good for its citizens. Economists tend to
reject such views. They prefer to let
people make their own choices as much
as possible.
Can Subsidies Be a Good
Thing for Everyone? In spite of these
drawbacks, can a case be made for
providing tax incentives for owner-
occupied housing? Yes, if homeownership
provides benefits to people other than the
homeowners themselves. Why does this
matter? Suppose that all the houses
along some street would benefit if one
house in particular ￿ call it the Smith
residence ￿ were converted from a
rental property to an owner-occupied
property. (Why they would so benefit
will be discussed in a moment.)
In a perfect world, the street￿s
residents would all get together, figure
out how much they would value this
conversion, get that much money
together, take it over to the Smiths, and
tell them to buy the unit.  The Smiths
may or may not take the money. That
would depend on whether these con-
tributions, when added to the money
the Smiths themselves put into the pot,
exceeded the cost of the conversion.
But what￿s important is that in this
perfect world, the right decision would
be made. By ￿right,￿ we simply mean
the change in status from renting to
owning should come about when, and
only when, the total benefits are greater
than the total costs. The total benefits
include those that accrue both to the
Smiths and to the Smiths￿ neighbors.
The Smiths, in making the decision
about ownership, are normally going to
think only about their private benefits.
The neighbors￿ contributions are
necessary to get the Smiths to consider
the external, or social, benefits. These
contributions lower the price of owner-
ship to the Smiths, causing them to
internalize, or take into consideration, the
external benefit.
But all this would happen in a
perfect world. In the real, imperfect
world, neighbors would not, under
ordinary circumstances, make these
contributions. The mere costs of
coordinating the rest of the neighbor-
hood would be enough to dissuade most
people from implementing this scheme.
Also, most people would find it difficult
to guess how much benefit they would
receive and so would not really know
what the right contribution was.
Perhaps most important, everyone
would wait for other people to make
their contributions first and hope that
this would be enough. They would try
to be what economists call free riders:
They would try to get the benefit
without paying the cost. And the
Smiths would stay renters.
This is where the government
might have a motive to step in. The tax
incentives described above are a way of
making the contributions that the
neighbors would have made in the
perfect world. They are an attempt to
replicate what the private market
would have done under ideal circum-




Incentives. In the previous scenario,
the neighbors were willing to ￿bribe￿
the Smiths into becoming homeowners
in the belief that ownership would
make them better neighbors ￿ home-
ownership would, in some way, change
their behavior. Economists call this
removing the moral hazard associated
with renting. The moral hazard in this
case involves an incentive to behave
￿badly￿ because renting provides less
incentive to behave ￿well.￿5 In what
ways does ownership mitigate moral
hazard? First, owners stay longer than
renters because buying a house involves
a lot of upfront costs that don￿t arise
when you rent. There are transfer
taxes, legal fees, and mortgage points to
be paid, as well as hidden costs such as
the time it takes to find just the right
house or condo. These are not costs
that households want to pay annually,
so people become owners only when
they are reasonably sure that they won￿t
have to pay them again for a long time.
Because owners usually live in their
units for a longer time, the payoff from
good behavior will be larger.
The second thing that makes
renters and owners behave differently is
that (regardless of time spent) owners
reap the rewards of any improvements;
renters do not. When it comes time to
sell the unit, the price will reflect the
wear and tear to the residence and any
deterioration to the neighborhood.
Renters never see a return on any
maintenance or care they may put into
the unit; hence, they have less
incentive to do so.
While these can be powerful
incentives, it￿s possible that the cause
and effect in the above arguments are
backward. It may be that the differ-
ences in behavior are unaffected by
whether a household owns or rents and
that the choice to own or rent is
motivated by the behavior itself.
How can this happen? Casual
observation can confirm what research
5 Moral hazard often comes up in the analysis
of  insurance markets, where being insured
against bad outcomes (illness, traffic
accidents) tempts people into risky behavior
that leads to these same outcomes.
[Another] thing that makes renters and owners
behave differently is that ... owners reap the
rewards of any improvements; renters do not.10   Q2  2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
has shown: that owners are, on average,
older, better educated, and richer than
renters.6 (See Homeownership in the
United States.) They are more often
married couples and, if they are not
retired, have more children living at
home. These demographic differences
can be powerful influences on how one
behaves, regardless of whether one is a
homeowner. Another important dif-
ference is that owners most of the time
live in single-family detached housing
units, while renters usually live in multi-
unit structures. Any number of these
factors could cause the kind of social
benefits that we might mistakenly asso-
ciate with the choice to own or rent.
Therefore, it would be a grave mistake
to simply compare renters￿ and
owners￿ behavior and attribute any
difference to the fact that their
housing choices are different.
In the discussion below,
a number of studies that com-
pare renters￿ and owners￿ behav-
ior are analyzed. None of them
makes the mistake of simply com-
paring the two groups; all of them
use a statistical tool called multiple
regression analysis, which allows the
analyst to factor in other ￿controls￿ to
isolate the ￿pure￿ effect of homeowner-
ship on behavior. For example, if the
multiple regression analysis ￿controls￿ for
income while measuring the effect of
the choice to own or rent, it allows us to
separate the influences of income and
ownership on behavior. In effect, it
shows how owners and renters with
identical incomes would behave
differently. Clearly, a fair number of
controls are necessary in order to isolate
the pure impact of homeownership ￿
that is, the change in behavior that
arises from becoming a homeowner.
Homeownership Influences
Behavior. For the most part, the studies
discussed above all provide a large
number of such controls; nevertheless,
the reader might retain the suspicion
that homeowners are different in some
deeper sense. Homeownership might be
motivated by a desire to have property of
one￿s own, a desire for stability, and
pride of ownership, things that cannot
be easily captured by age, income, or
other variables that we can measure in a
survey. Nevertheless, we can gain some
insight into how these motivations might
affect other behavior by looking at the
ownership decision itself. Much of the
research described below uses even
more sophisticated statistical techniques
to analyze who buys a house and who
doesn￿t and separates the motivations to
become a homeowner into observable
ones (income, kids, and so forth) and
unobservable ones. By doing this, we
can estimate the unobservable motiva-
tion and use it as a control when looking
at the behavioral differences of owners
and renters, thus providing greater
credibility to these measurements.
What, then, does the research
show?  We examine three behavioral
dimensions in which differences




argument can be made that owner-
occupants maintain their dwellings to a
greater extent than renters (or land-
lords) maintain theirs.7 Generally,
renters don￿t maintain rental units as
well as homeowners maintain their
houses precisely because owners reap
the benefit of good maintenance. The
very act of becoming an owner leads
people to behave differently toward
their property because they have a
financial incentive to do so. Thus, the
moral hazard argument for improved
maintenance in owner-occupied
housing is straightforward.
On the other hand, it may be
the case that renters are renters
because of their ingrained behavior
and that the difference is due to
adverse selection. Imagine that
the world has two kinds of
people: sloppy and neat. When
these two types of homeowners
try to sell their respective
properties, sloppy people pay for
their behavior because they
realize a lower selling price. Neat
people are rewarded for the time
they invested in being neat in the form
of higher prices.
But notice that when sloppy
people are renters, the landlord pays the
price of sloppy behavior and reaps the
rewards from having neat tenants. What
does a landlord do when faced with this
kind of  market? She probably can￿t tell
which type of tenant is moving in. If she
could, she would try to charge sloppy
renters a higher rent. Instead, she has to
raise rents for all tenants or impose
security deposits to cover the possibility
that a new tenant is a sloppy person. But
either of these strategies is going to drive
7 Landlords have an incentive to maintain
their units, but it is more costly for them to
do so than it is for owner-occupants. Among
other things, problems are harder to observe
because landlords do not live on the property.
6 See the article by Allen Goodman; the
article by L.M. Segal and D.G. Sullivan; and
my 1999 article.   Business Review  Q2  2002   11 www.phil.frb.org
the neat tenants away because now
homeownership is going to look like a
much better deal to a typical neat
person: He doesn￿t have to help pay for
sloppy people￿s behavior, and he doesn￿t
have to risk not getting his security
deposit back from a dishonest landlord.
Conversely, renting looks like a great
deal to sloppy people because they might
not have to pay the full cost of their
behavior. So now most of the rental
applicants will be sloppy people.
While something of a simplifi-
cation, the above analysis serves to
demonstrate that  renters aren￿t going to
be as careful as owner-occupants and
that while landlords clearly have an
incentive to maintain their units, they
are not going to provide upkeep as easily
or as cheaply as an owner-occupant.8
When this happens, it causes a neigh-
borhood externality.9
Various pieces of evidence
suggest that this sort of thing happens. In
what seems to be the only direct test,
George Galster found that more money
is spent on maintaining owner-occupied
housing than is spent on maintaining
rental property. Interestingly, he also
found that the effect was greater for
low-income households. Denise
DiPasquale and Edward Glaeser found
that homeowners spend more time
gardening than renters. Equally
important, though less direct, is the
8 There is always the possibility of too much
maintenance. The act of maintaining one￿s
property may create noise, for example, from a
hammer or lawnmower, and possibly other
inconveniences for one￿s neighbors.
9 An externality, or spillover, is an uncompen-
sated benefit or cost that results from the
actions of an individual or group. For
example, when a property owner does not
maintain his property, others in the neighbor-
hood may incur the cost in the form of lower
property values, and they are not compen-
sated for the decline in values. Similarly,
when a property owner maintains her
property, others in the neighborhood may
benefit in the form of higher property values,
and they do not have to contribute to the
cost of maintenance.
evidence provided by studies that test
whether rental property depreciates
faster than owner-occupied property.
Depreciation and maintenance are two
sides of the same coin: When money is
spent on maintenance, it slows down the
rate of depreciation. James Shilling, C.F.
Sirmans, and Jonathan Dombrow com-
pared depreciation rates of single-family
houses that were tenant-occupied with
ones that were owner-occupied and
found that, in fact, the rental units
depreciated significantly faster.
Is this difference due to
homeownership per se or to inherent
differences in owners and renters?
Galster￿s regression analysis contained a
number of important controls, including
a number of family demographic
characteristics and length of time in the
unit. DiPasquale and Glaeser also had a
large number of controls for demo-
graphic characteristics and building
type, and they also used the more
sophisticated statistical techniques that
control for the unobservable factors that
lead to homeownership. Perhaps the
most compelling, though somewhat
indirect, evidence is from a study by
John Harding, Thomas Miceli, and C.F.
Sirmans, who found that owners on the
brink of defaulting on their mortgage
loans engaged in less maintenance than
other owners. Thus, owners who become
more like renters (in the sense of having
less financial stake in their property)
have less incentive to maintain their
units, which provides additional
evidence of moral hazard in mainte-
nance.10
Child-Rearing. Children can
also create external effects in neighbor-
hoods. According to a study by Richard
Green and Michelle White, bad
behavior of children ￿ a homeowner￿s
own or his neighbors￿ ￿ ￿may reduce
the attractiveness of the neighborhood
and threaten the value of [the] homes.
Thus, homeowners have a stronger
incentive than renters to monitor their
own children and their neighbors￿
children.￿ The higher stake that
homeowners have in the quality of their
neighborhoods causes them to raise
better children to the benefit of all.
Although it￿s difficult to
measure the behavior of children
directly, there are a number of indicators
we can observe. Prominent among these
are the quality and level of education
children receive. While educational
attainment is not a direct measure of
neighborhood quality, the long tradition
of public education in the United States
attests to a societal belief that the
education of children has significant
external benefits. A number of studies
have asked whether children in renter
and owner households receive different
education when other factors are held
constant.
In fact, Green and White
found that homeowners￿ children are
less likely to drop out of school. Interest-
ingly, the effect appears to be more
pronounced in families with lower
incomes: A high-schooler in a family
with  $40,000 in income (in 1980, the
census year from which their data are
drawn ) is 4 percent less likely to drop
out of school when the family owns its
own home. However, for families with
an income of just $10,000 there is a 9
percent decline in dropout rates. A
similar study by D. Haurin, T. Parcel,
and R. Haurin measured the educa-
tional attainment of children as a
function of homeownership (among
other things) and found that math and
reading scores were about 7 to 9 percent
higher for the children of homeowners.
10 Such occupants may spend less because of
financial constraints, although the financial
return to maintenance provides incentives to
keep up the property, even for those most
constrained. These authors also speculate
that many kinds of maintenance are not
particularly visible and, therefore, may not
pay off upon sale of the unit. They found little
evidence that this is the case, though, and
anyway this sort of maintenance is not going
to cause the kind of neighborhood externality
under discussion here.12   Q2  2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
Homeownership in the United States
he U.S. Census Bureau defines the homeownership rate as the
percentage of households that own the unit in which they live.a
This rate increased more or less steadily throughout the 1990s,
particularly after 1994. However, there are significant differences in
homeownership rates across regions, ethnic groups, and other
demographic dimensions of U.S. society. To the extent that
homeownership is responsible ￿ as the text of the article proposes ￿ for maintaining
the social capital of a neighborhood or larger area, policymakers are right to be
concerned when homeownership rates for particular groups are low, especially when
groups are concentrated in certain areas.
For example, large differences in homeownership rates exist across the
different regions of the U.S. (Figure 1). Ownership rates are quite high in the
Midwest and South but much lower in the Northeast and West. In a forthcoming
study, I found that much of these differences can be traced to the character of large
northeastern cities, particularly New York City, which has a higher concentration of
high-density urban housing, which leads to more rental housing and higher prices
for homeownership. Higher prices for ownership (versus rental rates) also hinder the
growth of owner-occupied housing in the West (particularly in California and
Hawaii). Both of these low-homeownership regions also are home to large numbers
of immigrants (both foreign and domestic), who tend not to become homeowners
for a number of years after arriving at their new locations.
Immigration from other countries also helps explain the potentially puzzling
differences seen in Figure 2, which plots historical homeownership trends for whites,
blacks, Hispanic-Americans, and ￿others￿ (primarily Asian-Americans). It is clear
that white households have much higher ownership rates than any other group.
What is somewhat surprising is that Asian-Americans have such low rates, despite
the fact that their income levels are comparable to those of whites. Recent research
indicates that Asian households are more likely to be immigrant households and
that immigrants of all ethnic groups are less likely to own.b In any case, Asian-
American households are also likely to be younger and to live in the expensive Far
West and Northeast regions (regardless of their immigrant status).
African-Americans have historically tended to have very low ownership
rates. This is partly due to the lower income and wealth of African-American
households. But these differences in resources do not completely explain the low
propensity for homeownership. Some of the remaining difference may be attributed
to discrimination in mortgage or real estate markets. Hispanic families  have lower
homeownership rates than any other ethnic groups. While Hispanics and blacks
have roughly similar (low) income levels, the relatively large number of immigrants
among Hispanic households tends to drive down their homeownership rate below
that of African-Americans.c
Figure 3 gives the homeownership rate for different age groups for the
head of household for 2001. This figure shows that homeowners tend to be older
than renters and, therefore, more established citizens. Homeownership is very low
for people in their twenties, but it rises sharply as people enter their thirties. It stays at
a very high level for the remainder of one￿s life, declining only slightly when people
reach their mid-seventies.
T
a ￿Owner￿ does not mean that one has completely paid off one￿s mortgage.
b See my 1999 article, and the article by G. Painter, S. Gabriel, and D. Myers.
c See my 1999 article.
Homeownership also appears to
improve  noneducational measures of
behavior that may have external
consequences. For example, Green and
White found that the probability that a
girl in an ￿average￿ household will
become pregnant while in high school
decreases from roughly 13 percent to 11
percent if her family owns its home.
Haurin, Parcel, and Haurin found that
an index of  behavioral problems of
younger children declines about 3
percent  for children from an owner-
occupied dwelling.
Citizenship. The greater
commitment that homeowners presum-
ably have toward their neighborhoods
might very well manifest itself in greater
socialization with neighbors, civic
participation, volunteerism, and the like.
These activities have obvious external
benefits for the neighbors, who can ￿free
ride￿on others￿ efforts to make the
community a better place to live. To the
extent that homeownership does
encourage this kind of behavior, it
provides a powerful argument for
subsidizing ownership. On the 50th
anniversary of the Housing Act of 1949,
former Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development Andrew Cuomo said:
￿Housing is more than just bricks and
mortar; it is the building block of
community, it is powerfully tied to civic
behavior ￿ to working together with
neighbors on shared concerns, to literally
making us a part of a block, a neighbor-
hood, a town, a county, a nation.
Homeownership makes us stakeholders
in something grander than ourselves.￿11
Do homeowners behave in the
way that Secretary Cuomo suggests? In
a 1996 study, Peter Rossi and Eleanor
Weber used the General Social Survey
and other data to compare the actions of
renters and owners, actions that
11 Secretary Cuomo￿s speech is available in its
entirety at http://www.hud.gov/library/
bookshelf18/pressrel/nanm.html.   Business Review  Q2  2002   13 www.phil.frb.org
FIGURE 1
Regional Homeownership Rates, 1983-2000
FIGURE 2
Homeownership by Ethnic Group, 1983-2000
FIGURE 3
Homeownership Rates by Age, 2001
correspond in various ways to our
common perceptions of neighborliness.12
A large number of comparisons were
made, so it is not particularly surprising
that the results were mixed. In some
ways,  renters are better neighbors than
owners; in other ways, owners are
superior. For example, renters are ￿more
likely to spend evenings with neighbors,￿
which perhaps casts some doubt on the
greater ￿neighborliness￿ of owners;
however, owners are more likely to ￿give
help to others.￿
DiPasquale and Glaeser
derived rather different conclusions
from their examination of the  General
Social Survey. They found that
homeowners consistently provide a
greater degree of social benefit.
Specifically, DiPasquale and Glaeser
measured owners￿ and renters￿ propen-
sity to create neighborhood benefits
through tasks such as gardening,
volunteering for public services, being
interested in political affairs, and several
other activities. In practically all of the
cases that these two authors examined,
owners participated more in civic
activities than renters did.
The comparison between these
two studies is of interest in light of the
discussion above about controlling for
related influences. These two studies
both used the General Social Survey to
gauge owner-renter differences.
However, Rossi and Weber used only
two controls: age and an index of
socioeconomic status. While undoubt-
edly important, these two factors alone
probably cannot isolate the pure effect
of ownership. It is possible that some of
the results they get arise from this
problem. For example, the behavior
described as ￿more likely to spend
12 The General Social Survey, conducted by
the National Opinion Research Center at the
University of Chicago, is a survey of 1500
representative households in the United
States.
Source: Department of Housing & Urban Development, Housing Market Conditions,
November 2001.
Source: Department of Housing & Urban Development, Housing Market Conditions,
November 2001.
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This review of research seems to indicate that
homeownership provides external, or social,
benefits in the form of greater maintenance
and neighborhood conditions, better-raised
children, and better “civic” behavior.
evenings with neighbors￿ may be due to
the type of structures that renters live in
￿ multi-unit, high-density dwellings.
Indeed, an article by Edward
Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote looked at
the difference in social behavior across
building type (rather than tenure type)
and found that people who lived in
multi-unit buildings did socialize more
than those in detached units. Thus, a
failure to control for the type of
structure (among other differences)
may lead to misleading statements about
the benefits (or lack thereof) of
ownership. DiPasquale and Glaeser did
control for structure type and many
other differences; therefore, their results
about the positive social benefits of
homeownership carry somewhat more
credibility. As noted above, they found
that owners put more effort into
gardening than renters (thereby
creating the social benefit of a pleasant-
looking neighborhood).
While the opportunity to
garden is clearly related to the type of
housing one lives in, these authors
controlled for this difference and still
found that owners do more than renters.
DiPasquale and Glaeser were
also able to provide a deeper explanation
for homeowners￿ more neighborly
behavior. These authors related this
behavior to the fact that homeowners
stay in their units for a longer period of
time; they￿re not just there for the
investment. And the payoff to improv-
ing the neighborhood through partici-
pating in civic activities is higher the
longer one stays.
An analysis by William Rohe
and Michael Stegman indirectly
supports this notion. These authors
followed a group of low-income families
in Baltimore as they moved from rental
housing to subsidized homeownership in
a newly built neighborhood. When
Rohe and Stegman compared this group
with a control group that stayed in
rental housing, they found that owners
did not have a greater degree of activism
or involvement in the new neighbor-
hood than renters with similar demo-
graphic characteristics. The authors
attribute this, at least in part, to the fact
that in this particular case, the owners￿
neighborhood was very new. No
previous long-term residents had built up
an inventory of social capital, and
consequently, there was no easy way for
the new residents to contribute to that
inventory, despite their putative desire to
do so in their role as new homeowners.
The conclusion, therefore,
does not necessarily contradict that of
DiPasquale and Glaeser; the work of
these authors and of Rohe and Stegman
is consistent with homeownership
creating social benefits primarily because
homeownership creates longevity and
stability for neighborhoods.
THE POLICY DILEMMA
This review of research seems
to indicate that homeownership provides
external, or social, benefits in the form of
greater maintenance and neighborhood
conditions, better-raised children, and
better ￿civic￿ behavior. These research-
ers have taken great care to overcome
the objection that it￿s the type of people
who choose ownership that makes the
difference, and not the fact of owning
or renting.
If we accept the evidence that
homeownership does provide social
benefits, the question is whether this
should influence social policy. It was
suggested above that it should. In the
absence of some sort of subsidy to
homeownership, potential home buyers
will not take into account the social
aspects of their decisions, and therefore,
too few households will opt for owner-
ship. We￿ve noted that homeownership
is already heavily subsidized, primarily
because rental income to oneself is not
taxed and mortgage interest is deduct-
ible.  The questions then arise: Is this
the right amount of subsidization, and is
this the right way of going about it?
About the first question we
have very little to go on. All of the
research discussed in this article is
concerned with establishing the
existence of the social benefits of owner-
occupied housing, rather than the
harder question of how much external
value there is to homeownership. The
kinds of benefits brought about by
ownership would seem to be very hard
to quantify. What is the value of a well-
raised child or a neighbor who votes
more often? It￿s hard to know. However,
the cost of the tax subsidies to the
government and society is quite large, so
if the external benefits are not large, the
subsidies are clearly not justified. More
research in this area is clearly needed to
assess the monetary value of these
benefits.
Should the tax system be
changed? The mortgage interest
deduction has come under increased
scrutiny over the past decade or so, but
as pointed out by Satyajit Chatterjee,
this tax preference and the nontaxation
of owners￿ rental income go hand in
hand. J. Follain and L. Melamed make
this point forcefully. If only the mortgage
interest deduction were eliminated,
households with sufficient wealth to
purchase a home outright would still   Business Review  Q2  2002   15 www.phil.frb.org
enjoy a tax advantage from ownership
through the rental exclusion. Middle-
income households would no longer
have that advantage, since it would no
longer accrue to those who finance the
purchase of a house.13 Since the
taxation of implicit rent appears to be
infeasible, one might argue that the
mortgage interest deduction should stay
as well.
The policy dilemma is clear.
Homeownership has definite social
benefits, and on that account, there is a
clear case for subsidies that encourage
homeownership. Indeed, homeowner-
ship is subsidized. Furthermore, the tax
subsidies are very large, and they￿re
larger for high-income households than
for low-income ones. Moreover,
eliminating the subsidies from the tax
code would be difficult at best.
But the dilemma is com-
pounded because some of the research
discussed in this article indicates that
the social benefits are higher for low-
income households; therefore, the
benefits may be scaled the wrong way.
Green and White and other authors
have suggested the use of tax credits (as
opposed to tax deductions) for first-time
or low-income home buyers. In this way
we can better match the subsidies to
and benefits from homeownership and
provide a more coherent set of policies to
support an important social goal.
13 People who do not itemize their deductions
gain nothing and lose nothing from this
change; these may be the lowest income
households.
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